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THE YEARS 1987 and 1988 saw some dramatic  developments in U.S. 
financial  markets.  The 1987  stock market  crash  was followed in 1988  by 
intense corporate  restructuring  activity, including  a record volume of 
stock repurchases  and leveraged  buyouts.I Meanwhile  the use of debt 
financing  by U.S. corporations  continued  to increase, even among  firms 
not involved  in ownership  changes  or major  restructurings. 
The increase in corporate leverage has caused some concern to 
policymakers  responsible  for the stability  of the U.S. financial  system. 
Federal  Reserve Board Chairman  Alan Greenspan  testified in January 
1989 to the Senate Finance Committee that "the spate of mergers, 
acquisitions,  leveraged  buyouts, share  repurchases,  and divestitures  in 
We are grateful  to Eugene Wan for research  assistance, to Mark  Warshawsky  for 
comments  on an earlier  draft,  and to Steven Kaplan,  Scott Mason, and  the International 
Swap  Dealers  Association  for information  on the interest  rate swap market.  The views 
expressed  in this paper  are  those of the authors  and  do not necessarily  reflect  the opinions 
of the Board  of Governors  or its staff. 
1. Our  focus is not on leveraged  buyouts;  for studies of LBOs, see Kaplan  (1990); 
Lichtenberg  and Siegel (1989a, 1989b);  Marais,  Schipper,  and Smith  (1989).  Many  firms 
have  increased  their  use of debt without  being  involved  in LBOs;  indeed,  Margaret  Blair 
and  Robert  Litan  (1989)  find  almost  no correlation  between  increasing  leverage  and  LBO 
activity  in a sample  of U.S. manufacturing  industries.  Our  sample  of firms  excludes  firms 
that  have  been  taken  private  and  thus  is relatively  uninformative  about  LBO activity. 
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recent  years  is  a  significant  development....  While  the  evidence 
suggests  that  the restructurings  of the 1980's  probably  are  improving,  on 
balance, the efficiency of the American  economy, the worrisome and 
possibly excessive degree of leveraging associated with this process 
could create a new set of problems  for the financial  system.  2 
This report  updates  the evidence in our  earlier  Brookings  Panel  paper 
on the changing  capital structure  of the U.S. corporate  sector.3  As in 
that paper, our first objective is to characterize in detail the entire 
distribution  of leverage  across industries  and individual  firms.  By using 
firm-specific  information  available  on the COMPUSTAT  data  tapes, we 
go beyond the usual focus on aggregate  numbers. We also assess the 
potential social costs and benefits of the increased leverage of recent 
years. 
The Changing Capital Structure of the U.S. Corporate Sector 
A standard  source of information  on the changing  corporate  capital 
structure  is the system of Flow of Funds accounts produced by the 
Federal Reserve Board. According to the Flow of Funds, debt-asset 
ratios  for the nonfinancial  corporate  sector (with  debt measured  at book 
value  and  equity  at market  value)  rose from  0.40 in 1985  and 1986  to 0.42 
in 1987  and 0.43 in 1988. Much of the increase was the result of firms 
swapping  equity for debt; the Flow of Funds shows net equity repur- 
chases of about $80 billion in each of the years 1985, 1986, and 1987, 
increasing  to just over $130  billion  in 1988.4  (Preliminary  figures  for 1989 
show rates of debt issuance and equity repurchase  almost identical  to 
those for 1988.)  The debt-asset  ratio  in 1988  is the same, after  a six-year 
economic expansion, as the ratio  in 1981  and is only 1 percentage  point 
below the all-time high in 1975, both recession troughs. The recent 
increase in leverage is thus highly  unusual  at this stage of the business 
cycle. 
In  this  report  we concentrate  on a  different,  disaggregated  data  source: 
the 1989 COMPUSTAT  data tape, which gives accounting data for 
2. Greenspan  (1989,  p. 1). 
3. Bernanke  and Campbell  (1988).  See also Warshawsky  (1990)  for a recent  analysis 
in a similar  spirit. 
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Table 1.  Annual Growth Rates, COMPUSTAT Firms,  1987-88 
Percent 
Debt 
After-tax  Interest  Book  Market  Market 
Year  Sales  earnings  expense  value  value  equity 
Full sample 
1987  10.7  38.1  2.0  4.5  2.7  2.7 
1988  9.4  13.0  8.3  6.5  4.5  8.4 
Median  firm (50th  percentile) 
1987  9.2  36.9  3.6  1.6  1.2  2.0 
1988  10.3  11.3  8.9  2.5  5.1  5.4 
Source:  Standard and Poor  Corporation,  Comlpiustat  Anntual Inidiustrial,  Over-the-Counlter, and Research  Files. 
New  York.  1989 edition.  The sample consists  of  1,179 firms for which all data are available  in 1986, 1987, and  1988 
on a consistent  basis.  (See  the appendix for details.) 
several  thousand  U.S. corporations.  Our  data set, which excludes firms 
that lack complete and consistently reported  data for the years 1986, 
1987,  and 1988,  includes almost 1,200  corporations.  These companies, 
which had total sales of $2.3 trillion  and book debt outstanding  of $675 
billion in  1988, include almost all the largest publicly traded U.S. 
corporations.' 
Details  about  the  construction  of our  data  set are  given  in  the  appendix, 
and a summary  of the data appears  in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 reports 
growth rates in 1987 and 1988 of some important  financial  variables. 
Growth  rates are reported  both for the full sample (that is, treating  all 
the companies as if they were a single firm and adding  up the dollar 
quantities  of each variable)  and  for the median  firm. 
Both 1987  and 1988  were years of steady growth  in sales, with growth 
rates between 9 percent and 11 percent for the full sample and for the 
median  firm.  After-tax  earnings  grew more than 35 percent  in 1987,  but 
slowed  down in 1988.  Sales and  earnings  growth  outpaced  the growth  in 
the book value of debt and interest  expense in both years. Table 1 also 
shows growth rates for the market value of debt and equity. Not 
surprisingly,  1987  was a relatively  poor year for equities, with less than 
3 percent  growth  in market  value. In 1988  the stock market  rebounded, 
5. See table 2. Firms that have been taken private are excluded from the sample. 
However,  we do not believe that  this is an important  source  of bias  in this or our  previous 
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Table 2.  Sources and Uses of Funds, COMPUSTAT Firms,  1986-88 
Billions of current  dollars 
Sources  Uses  Reference 
After-tax  Net debt  Net equity  Total  Book 
Year  earnings  issue  repurchase  dividends  Other  Sales  debt 
1986  82.7  47.5  5.2  53.4  71.6  1,914  606.6 
1987  114.3  27.3  8.1  64.4  69.2  2,118  633.9 
1988  129.2  40.9  26.0  73.0  71.1  2,316  674.9 
Source:  1989 COMPUSTAT  tape.  The  sample  consists  of  1,179 firms for which  all data  are available  in  1986, 
1987, and 1988 on a consistent  basis.  (See  the appendix for details.) 
with more than 8 percent growth for the full sample and more than 5 
percent growth for the median firm. The market value of debt grew 
slightly  less than  the market  value of equity in each year. 
Table 2 shows the levels of some key variables  for the full sample  in 
1986, 1987,  and 1988.  The dramatic  growth  in earnings  in 1987  shows up 
again  in this table. The table  also reinforces  the Flow of Funds evidence 
that 1988  was a record  year  for net equity  repurchases.  In the COMPU- 
STAT sample, net repurchases  totaled $26 billion in 1988, more than 
three times the 1987  volume. 
Tables 1 and 2 give the impression  that U.S. corporate  leverage was 
stable or decreasing  in 1987  and 1988,  thus contradicting  the aggregate 
numbers  from  the Flow of Funds accounts. Our  sample  appears  to be a 
conservative one that understates the changes taking place in the 
corporate  sector as a whole.6 
Even in our sample,  however, the leverage  of the most highly  levered 
firms  continued  to increase in 1987  and 1988. In table 3 we summarize 
the cross-sectional  distribution  of various  measures  of leverage, giving 
values for the full sample,  for the median  firm  (50th  percentile),  and for 
firms  at the 90th, 95th, and  99th  percentiles  of the distribution. 
We begin  with a "stock" concept of the debt burden,  the ratio  of the 
market  value of debt to the total market  value of the corporation.  This 
ratio  is not a straightforward  measure  because the market  value of debt 
is not reported  on the COMPUSTAT  tape, but must be imputed. Our 
two techniques  for doing this, which we call Method  A and Method  B, 
6.  Below we compare  our data with industry  balance  sheet data  from the Quarterly 
Financial  Reports, published  by the Department  of Commerce.  This comparison  also 
suggests  that  our sample  understates  the overall  increase  in corporate  leverage. Ben S. Bernanke, John  Y. Campbell,  and Toni M.  Whited  259 
are discussed in detail in our earlier  paper.7  For the full sample, both 
methods  show slowly declining  debt-asset  ratios  during  1986-88,  but  the 
median  and  higher  percentiles  of the distribution  all increase. 
Table  3 also shows some "flow" concepts of debt burden  using three 
measures:  interest  expense  relative  to cash  flow  (operating  income  before 
depreciation,  interest,  and  taxes are  deducted),  interest  expense relative 
to a three-year  moving  average  of cash  flow, and  interest  expense relative 
to current  assets. 
The full sample  interest  expense-cash flow ratio peaked in 1986  and 
then fell. The median  ratio, however, remained  constant, and the 90th 
percentile  of the distribution  increased  from 1986  to 1988,  a particularly 
striking  development  given the rapid  growth  in corporate  earnings  over 
this period. A similar  pattern is observable when interest expense is 
measured  relative to a three-year  moving average of cash flow; unsur- 
prisingly,  the full sample ratio tends to fall by less while the ratio for 
higher  segments  of the distribution  increases by more, because it gives 
less weight  to high 1987  and 1988  income. The ratio  of interest  expense 
to current  assets also displays the same pattern  as that of the moving 
average  ratio  except at the 99th  percentile. 
The numbers  in table 3 take on additional  significance  when they are 
compared  with our finding  in our earlier  paper that in 1986  debt-asset 
ratios  and interest  expense ratios  were at levels previously  seen only in 
the recessions of 1973-74  and 1981-82.8  The increase  in interest  burdens 
in the 1980s  particularly  stood out in that earlier  paper, as did the fact 
that  leverage  increased  more in highly  levered than  in more moderately 
levered  firms. 
What  table  3 shows is that, contrary  to expectations,  debt-asset  ratios 
and interest expense ratios have not fallen rapidly  toward  levels more 
normal  for the past 20 years, but  have fallen  very slowly or, for the most 
indebted  firms, even risen slightly. Even though earnings  in 1987  and 
equity  values in 1988  grew rapidly,  for many  firms  interest  expense and 
the value  of debt grew even more  quickly  over the period. 
7. Bernanke  and  Campbell  (1988).  A brief  discussion  of the 1988  methodology  appears 
in the  notes  to table  3. 
8. Bernanke  and  Campbell  (1988).  The levels of the series in table  3 and  in our earlier 
paper  are  not directly  comparable,  because  the sample  in this paper  is different  and some 
of the accounting  conventions  used on the COMPUSTAT  tape have changed.  (See the 
appendix  for details.)  However, we can splice growth  rates  up to 1986  (from  the previous 
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Table 3.  Distribution of Debt-Asset, Interest Expense, and Price-Earnings Ratios, 
COMPUSTAT Firms,  1986-88 
Financial  Percentile  Number  of 
ratio and  Full  firms  in 
year  samplea  50  90  95  99  full  sample 
Market value debt to assets 
Method  Ab 
1986  0.305  0.323  0.596  0.702  0.817  1,179 
1987  0.305  0.346  0.660  0.747  0.863  1,179 
1988  0.297  0.334  0.632  0.714  0.883  1,179 
Method  Bc 
1986  0.282  0.282  0.587  0.687  0.859  1,179 
1987  0.276  0.318  0.642  0.726  0.864  1,179 
1988  0.271  0.309  0.627  0.734  0.895  1,179 
Interest  expense  to cash floWd 
1986  0.188  0.219  1.713  co  co  1,177 
1987  0.174  0.219  1.247  co  co  1,177 
1988  0.168  0.219  1.859  co  00  1,177 
Interest  expense  to moving-average  cash floWd 
1986  0.188  0.233  0.997  6.347  co  1,137 
1987  0.185  0.244  1.168  co  co  1,137 
1988  0.187  0.243  1.481  co  co  1,137 
Interest  expense  to current assets 
1986  0.087  0.052  0.247  0.355  0.819  1,174 
1987  0.081  0.053  0.250  0.369  0.712  1,174 
1988  0.084  0.059  0.259  0.374  0.623  1,174 
Price  to earnings 
1986  16.695  20.000  ...  ...  ...  1,175 
1987  12.664  14.584  ...  ...  ...  1,175 
1988  11.459  14.020  ...  ...  ...  1,175 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  the  COMPUSTAT  data  base.  Missing  entries  in  the  table  correspond  to 
negative  earnings.  Values  of  the  ratios of  interest  expense  to cash  flow  that are negative  or greater than  100 are 
shown  as m. 
a.  Full sample includes firms for which all data are available in  1986, 1987, and 1988 on a consistent  basis. 
b.  Brainard-Shoven-Weiss  approach, modified to reflect additional sample information (when available) about the 
maturity  structures  of  firms' debt.  Long-term  debt  is  assumed  to  be  issued  at a 20-year  maturity.  See  Brainard, 
Shoven,  and Weiss  (1980) and Bernanke and Campbell (1988). 
c.  The  market  value  of  debt  is  measured  by  capitalizing  reported  interest  payments,  using  the  debt  maturity 
structure and coupon  rates implied in each  year by Method A. 
d.  Ratio of  interest expense  to cash  flow (operating income  before  depreciation,  taxes,  and interest expense  are 
deducted).  We use a three-year moving average for cash flow. 
Leverage and Macroeconomic  Stability 
The most common reason for concern about increasing  leverage is 
that it may have an adverse impact on macroeconomic  stability. Our Ben S. Bernanke,  John Y. Campbell,  and Toni  M. Whited  261 
findings  suggest  that  there  is a basis for this concern. First, leverage  has 
increased  in  durable  goods industries,  which  are  sensitive  to the  business 
cycle, as well as in more cyclically stable nondurable  goods industries. 
Second, a recession  like that  of 1973-74  or 1981-82  would  rapidly  worsen 
financial  conditions in many firms. Finally, although  some argue that 
debt  obligations  have  become  easier  to renegotiate  when  firms  encounter 
financial  difficulties,  so that the corporate  sector can safely increase its 
leverage,  there  is no evidence  for such  a change  in the nature  of corporate 
debt. 
Corporate Leverage  by Industry 
It is sqmetimes  claimed  that the recent increases in leverage do not 
threaten  the financial  stability  of the U.S. economy because they have 
taken place in noncyclical industries.  This point is strongly  argued  by 
Stephen  Roach  and  is also mentioned  by Greenspan.9  Table  4 addresses 
this issue by showing market  value debt-asset ratios broken down by 
industry  and  by industrial  category. To give a longer  historical  perspec- 
tive, numbers  are reported  for the periods 1970-75, 1976-81, and 1982- 
86, as well as for 1986, 1987, and 1988. (See the appendix  for details.) 
The table also gives the 1988  share  of each industry  in the market  value 
of the sample as a whole. At the far right are the industry "earnings 
beta" (the coefficient  from a regression  of the growth rate of industry 
real  earnings  on the growth  rate  of real  GNP) and "earnings  sigma"  (the 
standard  deviation  of the growth  rate of industry  real earnings).  These 
are crude measures of the cyclical sensitivity or riskiness of each 
industry.  The earnings  beta and earnings  sigma are generally strongly 
correlated,  with the notable  exception of the petroleum  industry,  whose 
earnings  are highly  variable  but countercyclical  over this period. 
Until 1986,  the cyclically stable  nondurable  manufacturing  sector did 
9. Roach  (1988)  and Greenspan  (1989).  Greenspan  says, "Restructuring  activity has 
been  especially  prevalent  in the trade,  services, and, more  recently,  the food and  tobacco 
industries.  For  such  businesses,  a substantial  increase  in debt  may  raise  the probability  of 
bankruptcy  by only a relatively small amount." On the other hand he also says that 
"roughly  two-fifths  of merger  and acquisition  activity, as well as LBO's, have involved 
companies  in cyclically  sensitive  industries  that  are more  likely to run  into trouble  in the 
event  of a severe  economic  downturn." >.;  66M  6666  6  00~~~~~~~~~~~4)  0 
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indeed  increase  its leverage  faster  than  the  durable  manufacturing  sector. 
The market value debt-asset ratio for nondurable  manufacturing  was 
0.21 in 1970-75, but it had risen to 0.25 by  1982-86; the cyclically 
sensitive durable  manufacturing  sector, meanwhile, reduced its debt- 
asset ratio from 0.28 to 0.22 over the same period. During 1986-88, 
however, these trends reversed. The debt-asset ratio for nondurables 
fell from 0.24 to 0.23 between 1982-86  and 1988, while the debt-asset 
ratio for durables  rose from 0.22 to 0.25. In 1988  the level of the debt- 
asset ratio  was higher  for durable  industries  than  for nondurable  indus- 
tries,  just as it was in 1970-75  at the beginning  of our sample  period. 
A breakdown of leverage by industry shows a wide diversity of 
experience. Some cyclical industries,  like glass-concrete  and  transport, 
have high 1988  debt-asset ratios, while others, like vehicles and elec- 
tronics, have much  lower ratios. Figure 1  plots the 1988  debt-asset  ratio 
of each industry  against  its earnings  beta coefficient, showing  that  there 
is no clear relationship  between the leverage of an industry and the 
riskiness  of its earnings  stream.  10 
Table 5 repeats the industry  breakdown  of table 4 for the ratio of 
interest expense to cash flow. Here again  the nondurable  sector shows 
greater increases in debt burdens up to 1986, but nondurable  goods 
interest expense ratios  fall slightly  from 1986  to 1988.  Interest  expense 
ratios for the durable  goods manufacturing  sector have fluctuated  but 
are higher  than  nondurable  interest  expense ratios  in every period. 
Figure  2 plots the ratio of 1988  interest  expense to cash flow of each 
industry against its  earnings beta. The figure gives  a weak visual 
impression of a negative relationship  between interest expense and 
earnings beta, but this is caused almost entirely by the petroleum 
industry,  which has a negative  earnings  beta and  a 1988  interest  expense 
ratio of 0.45.  '1 Overall  there is no clear tendency for cyclical industries 
to have either  lower or higher  leverage  than  noncyclical  industries. 
10. The figures  look broadly  similar  if the 1986-88 average  debt-asset  ratio, or the 
change  in the debt-asset  ratio over 1986-88, or the change  from 1971-80  to 1986-88, is 
plotted on the vertical  axis. A figure  with the earnings  sigma  (the standard  deviation  of 
earnings  growth)  on the horizontal  axis also shows no clear relation  between industry 
leverage  and  earnings  risk. 
11. A figure  with  the earnings  sigma  on the horizontal  axis gives a weak  impression  of 
a positive relationship  between risk and leverage, but again this is largely due to the 
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Figure 1.  1988 Market Value Debt-Asset Ratio and Cyclical Sensitivity 
of Industry Earnings 
Debt-asset  ratio 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  using COMPUSTAT  data base and reported in table 4. 
a.  Cyclical  sensitivity  measure  is  equal  to  earnings  beta  from  table 4,  the  coefficient  from  a  regression  of  the 
growth rate of industry real earnings on the growth rate of real GNP. 
The Impact of a Recession 
In view of the 1986-88  increase in U.S. corporate  leverage, particu- 
larly  in more highly  levered firms  and in cyclically sensitive industries, 
it should  not  be surprising  that  many  U. S. corporations  appear  vulnerable 
to financial  distress in the event of a major  recession. 
In our  earlier  paper  we simulated  the effects of the 1973-74  recession 
and  the 1981-82  recession  on corporations  with  a 1986  capital  structure.'12 
12. During  the 1973-74  recession the value of the stock market  fell sharply.  Under 
these simulation  conditions  debt-asset  ratios  would  be expected to worsen  as the market 
value  of firms  declines.  During  the 1981-82  recession  the stock  market  fell less, but  interest 
rates  were very high. Under  these simulation  conditions  interest  expense burdens  would 
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Figure 2.  1988 Interest Expense-Cash  Flow Ratio and Cyclical Sensitivity 
of Industry Earnings 
Interest  expense - cash flow ratio 
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Source:  Authors'  calculations  using COMPUSTAT  data base and reported in table 5. 
a.  Measure  of cyclical  sensitivity  of industry earnings equal to earnings beta from table 5, the coefficient  from a 
regression  of the growth rate of industry real earnings on the growth rate of real GNP. 
About 20 percent of the firms in our sample encountered solvency 
problems  by the second year of the 1973-74 simulation,  and a similar 
fraction  of the firms  encountered  liquidity  problems  by the second year 
of  the  1981-82 simulation.13  In table 6  (left-hand side), we  obtain 
qualitatively  similar  results for our sample of 1988 corporations.  The 
1973-74 simulation  is particularly  dramatic:  the full sample debt-asset 
ratio for firms that reported  data in both 1973-74 and 1988  rises from 
0.30 in 1988  to 0.45 in the first  year of the simulation,  and to 0.70 in the 
13. Bernanke  and Campbell  (1988, p. 120). By a "solvency problem," we mean a 
simulated  debt-asset ratio greater than unity; by a "liquidity  problem," we mean a 
simulated  interest  expense to cash flow ratio  greater  than  one or less than  zero (negative 
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Table 6.  Simulations of the 1973-74  and 1981-82  Recessions on Corporate Financial 
Structure of 1988, COMPUSTAT Firms 
Variable interest rates  Fixed  interest rates 
Full  Percentile  Full  Percentile 
Year  samplea  50  75  90  samplea  50  75  90 
1973-74  recession 
Debt-asset  ratio 
1988  0.302  0.318  0.484  0.640  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Recession  year 1  0.447  0.457  0.864  Co  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Recession  year 2  0.695  0.621  Co  00  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Interest expense-cash  flow ratio 
1988  0.182  0.212  0.358  1.034  0.182  0.212  0.358  1.034 
Recession  year  1  0.153  0.216  0.404  1.092  0.152  0.215  0.403  1.089 
Recession  year 2  0.142  0.234  0.447  1.323  0.137  0.222  0.427  1.242 
1981-82  recession 
Debt-asset  ratio 
1988  0.291  0.330  0.485  0.633  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Recession  year  1  0.310  0.337  0.500  0.660  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Recession  year 2  0.291  0.311  0.478  0.710  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Interest expense-cash  flow ratio 
1988  0.172  0.216  0.383  1.295  0.172  0.216  0.383  1.295 
Recession  year  1  0.202  0.243  0.467  5.383  0.189  0.229  0.436  4.397 
Recession  year 2  0.225  0.275  0.718  00  0.206  0.255  0.670  00 
Source:  Authors' calculations  using COMPUSTAT  data base.  For complete  description of the simulation method, 
see  Bernanke  and Campbell  (1988).  Values  of  debt-asset  ratios  greater than unity are shown  as  -.  Values  of  the 
ratios of interest expense  to cash flow that are negative  or greater than 100 are shown  as 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  The  sample for the  1973-74 recession  simulation  is a set  of 617 firms that had complete  data available  during 
1972-74 and 1988; the sample for the  1981-82 simulation is a set of 875 firms that had complete  data during 1980-82 
and 1988. 
second  year  of the simulation.  By the second year  of the simulation,just 
over 25 percent  of the firms  in the sample  have become insolvent in the 
sense that their simulated  debt-asset ratios are greater  than unity.14  In 
other  words, these firms  have equity cushions in 1988  that  are less than 
the  decline  in  their  market  value  during  the 1973-74  recession. The 1981- 
82 simulation  has flat debt-asset ratios but large increases in interest 
expense ratios, so that  just over 20 percent of the firms  in the sample 
have  liquidity  problems  in the second year of the simulation. 
14. The very high  fraction  of predicted  insolvencies  no doubt  reflects  to some degree 
the crudeness  of the simulation  procedure.  Our  preferred  interpretation  of these numbers 
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Interest Rate  Hedging 
One objection to these simulations is that they assume that firms 
with short-term  debt outstanding are vulnerable to increases in re- 
financing  costs if interest  rates rise. In recent years, however, corpora- 
tions have increasingly  used interest  rate swaps (and  related  techniques 
such as interest  rate caps and swap options) to hedge interest  rate risk. 
A firm that has swapped floating-rate  for fixed-rate  debt continues to 
have floating-rate  liabilities reported on its balance sheet and on the 
COMPUSTAT  tape, but it has no exposure to general  increases in the 
level of interest  rates.  15 
The interest  rate  swap  market  is quite  large  relative  to the outstanding 
debt of our sample of corporations.  In 1988 U.S.  dollar interest rate 
swaps with a principal  value  of $484  billion  were carried  out by members 
of the International  Swap  Dealers  Association  (the trade  association  for 
the financial  institutions  that organize these transactions).16 The total 
book debt outstanding  for our sample of firms in 1988 is $675 billion 
(table  2). 
It should not be inferred  from the volume of swaps, however, that 
nonfinancial  corporations  have completely hedged their interest rate 
risks. First, probably less than half the total swap volume involved 
nonfinancial  corporations;  the remainder  was attributable  to financial 
institutions  or government  agencies. Second, the maturities  involved 
are  generally  quite  short,  with  about  20 percent  of the 1988  swaps having 
a one-year  maturity  and  30 percent  having  a two- to three-year  maturity. 
Short maturities  limit the effectiveness of swaps in hedging  the risk of 
persistent  changes  in interest  rates. And, third,  to the extent that swaps 
15. The firm  is not in the same position  as if it had issued fixed-rate  debt, however, 
because it is still exposed to an increase  in its own borrowing  cost relative  to the floating 
rate used in the swap agreement.  Such an increase  could occur either  because the firm's 
credit  rating  falls, or because  the yield  spread  between  bonds  of the firm's  rating  and  high- 
quality  bonds  increases.  Also fixed-rate  debt can often be prepaid  or called  at or close to 
par,  while  swap  agreements  can  only be terminated  by marking  them  to market.  See Arak, 
Estrella, Goodman,  and Silver (1988);  Bicksler  and Chen (1986);  Price and Henderson 
(1988);  and Smith, Smithson,  and Wakeman  (1988)  for detailed  accounts of the interest 
rate  swap  market. 
16. We are  grateful  to the ISDA for supplying  this information.  The $484  billion  figure 
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occur  between nonfinancial  corporations,  interest  rate  risk  has not been 
removed  from  corporate  balance  sheets, only redistributed. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty  for our simulation  methodology is that 
the  most  highly  levered  firms,  which  encounter  the  most  serious  problems 
in our simulations,  may be the ones that make the most effective use of 
interest rate swaps. If this is the case, then even the small part of the 
swap market  that is long-term  and involves nonfinancial  corporations 
might  have a big effect on our results. 
As a crude  way to test for this possibility, the right-hand  side of table 
6 repeats  our simulations  of interest expense ratios  fixing  interest  rates 
at the levels prevailing in the base year of the simulation. This is 
equivalent  to assuming  that firms  are fully hedged and can roll over all 
their  debts at fixed interest  rates. The results are very close to those in 
the simulations  with variable interest rates, indicating that liquidity 
problems occur primarily  because earnings and the market value of 
assets drop  in  a recession, not because  short-term  interest  rates  increase. 
A Change  in the Nature  of Debt 
A possible counterargument  to our concerns about leverage is that 
increased  corporate  debt poses little threat  to financial  stability  because 
of a change in the nature  of debt during  the 1980s. In particular,  it has 
been argued  that fixed interest obligations  have become less costly to 
renegotiate-more  like equity in this respect-so  that the potential 
bankruptcy  costs associated with any given amount of leverage are 
reduced.  17 
It is certainly  possible that such a change in the nature  of debt has 
occurred,  but the fact is that we have very little hard  evidence.18  As a 
practical  matter, explicit attempts to make debt more like equity are 
17. See Gertler  and  Hubbard  (1989)  for  an  insightful  discussion  of the  issues. Bernanke 
and  Campbell  (1990)  also touch  on these points.  Giammarino  (1989)  presents  a theoretical 
model  that  explains  why costless renegotiation  is not always  preferred  to the costly use of 
the bankruptcy  law. Gilson,  John,  and  Lang  (1989)  discuss some recent  cases of reorgan- 
ization  of firms  in financial  distress. 
18. One  fact that ought  to be easily ascertainable  is how many  firms  have gone into 
bankruptcy  court.  Even  this  is muddled,  unfortunately,  by  a change  in  Dun  and  Bradstreet'  s 
business  failure  coverage in 1984. However, we can say that the business failure  rate 
roughly  quadrupled  between 1979  and 1983  and  has remained  relatively  stable  since 1984; 
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hampered  by the scrutiny  of the Internal  Revenue Service;  for example, 
it is not possible to link principal  obligations  to macroeconomic  condi- 
tions (which  from  a theoretical  point of view would be highly  desirable) 
without  losing tax deductibility.19  Closer holding  of a firm's debt obli- 
gations should  tend to lower renegotiation  costs, but there is not much 
evidence  of a U.S. trend  toward  such  Japanese-style  arrangements.  It is 
known that  junk bonds, for example, are more widely held than more 
traditional  forms  of corporate  debt such as private  placements  and  bank 
debt. And because  junk bonds, especially recent issues, have elaborate 
covenants that restrict further  borrowing  by corporations,  distressed 
corporations  find  it more  difficult  to continue  operating  while renegotia- 
tion takes place.20 
Leverage and Efficiency 
Is it  possible  that  increased  corporate  leverage  can  offer  social  benefits 
that  offset the increased  instability  it introduces  into the U.S. economy? 
Proponents  of leverage argue that corporate efficiency is greatly en- 
hanced  by the pressure  of debt obligations  that prevent  managers  from 
wasting  "free cash flow."21 
Empirical  work on this question has focused almost exclusively on 
leveraged  buyouts. Frank  Lichtenberg  and  Donald  Siegel, for example, 
report  that  total  factor  productivity  (TFP)  increases,  while  administrative 
overhead costs decrease, after firms undergo LBOs.22  Here we look 
more broadly at leverage in manufacturing  industries and search for 
links  between  the growth  of leverage  and  productivity  in the 1980s. 
Table  7 summarizes  an alternative  source of evidence on leverage by 
industry. The data come from the Quarterly  Financial Report of the 
Bureau  of the Census. The table gives debt-asset ratios at book value 
(no market  value data are available  from the QFR), and in this respect 
19. Gertler  and  Hubbard  (1989). 
20. See Baker  and  Wruck  (1990)  for a description  of the bond  convenants  involved  in 
one recent  LBO. 
21. Jensen  (1989).  We note  an apparent  contradiction  between  this  argument,  that  fear 
of bankruptcy  is an important  device for controlling  managerial  behavior,  and the claim, 
just discussed,  that  ease of renegotiation  makes  bankruptcy  inconsequential. 
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Table 7.  Book Value Debt-Asset Ratios and Total Factor Productivity, Sample of QFR 
Manufacturing Industries, Selected Years,  1977-88 
1986 TFP 
Book value debt-asset  ratioa  (index,  1981  = 100) 
Industry  1977  1981  1984  1986  1988b  Actual  Adjustedc 
Manufacturing  0.216  0.222  0.225  0.259  0.276  110  ... 
Nondurable  manufacturing 
Chemicals  0.244  0.256  0.222  0.267  0.278  113  103 
Food  0.263  0.264  0.311  0.347  0.361  104  101 
Paper  0.205  0.261  0.284  0.312  0.286  113  103 
Petroleum  products  0.168  0.174  0.229  0.269  0.269  104  105 
Printing  and 
publishing  0.189  0.236  0.234  0.299  0.311  97  94 
Textiles  0.262  0.252  0.270  0.304  0.388  108  99 
Tobaccod  0.311  0.272  0.220  0.366  ...  80  89 
Durable  manufacturing 
Electronics  0.171  0.175  0.166  0.196  0.211  113  96 
Glass and concrete  0.244  0.273  0.271  0.342  0.373  107  105 
Instruments  0 161  0.138  0.155  0.194  0.297  104  96 
Machinery  0.198  0.235  0.201  0.226  0.245  130  113 
Metal  products  0.219  0.220  0.256  0.284  0.301  105  101 
Primary  metal  0.284  0.272  0.316  0.321  0.307  102  94 
Rubber  and plastic  0.261  0.262  0.248  0.303  0.361  109  101 
Vehicles  0.146  0.172  0.116  0.162  0.173  109  99 
Source:  Data for debt-asset  ratios  from  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Quiarterly Fitnatncial  Report for  Matm{ifactuiritng, 
Mintiitg, atnd Trade Corporations  (Department  of  Commerce,  various  years).  Total  factor  productivity  data from 
Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Department of Labor. 
a.  Ratio is equal to book value of debt (short-term debt plus long-term debt) as a percentage  of total assets. 
b.  Debt-asset  ratio data for 1988 are from the second  quarter. All other data are foLtrth  quarter. 
c.  Adjusted TFP  obtained  by  regressing  each  industry's  TFP  growth  on  a constant,  a dummy  equal to one  for 
1973 and later years  (to  allow  for  the  "productivity  slowdown"),  the  lagged  industry  TFP  growth  rate,  and the 
growth rate of total manufacturing TFP. 
d.  After  1985, because  of mergers and acquisitions,  the QFR stopped  reporting tobacco  manufactures (SIC code 
21) balance sheet data. The  1986 number in the table is actually from  1985:4. 
the numbers  are less satisfactory  than those reported  in tables 4 and 5. 
On the other hand, the QFR data are much more comprehensive  (see 
the appendix  for a description  of these data). 
The debt-asset  ratios in table 7 show larger  increases over 1986-88 
than  do the ratios  reported  in table  4. This discrepancy  reflects  both the 
difference  between  market  value and book value ratios  and the broader 
coverage  of the QFR data.23  It is reassuring,  however, that the relative 
changes  in leverage of different  industries  are quite similar  in tables 4 
23. Recall  that  the aggregate  Flow of Funds  data, which use market  value of equity, 
also show  stronger  increases  than  our  COMPUSTAT  sample. 274  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
and 7. The changes in debt-asset  ratios  from 1986  to 1988,  for example, 
have a correlation  of 0.6 across the two tables. 
Table  7 also reports  two measures  of total factor  productivity  growth 
during  1981-86-"actual  TFP" and "adjusted  TFP." Actual TFP is a 
TFP index number  from the Bureau  of Labor Statistics, normalized  so 
that  each industry  had total factor  productivity  of 100  in 1981.  Adjusted 
TFP  is the  ratio  of actual  to predicted  TFP  growth  and  therefore  measures 
the unexpected  part  of TFP  growth.  If leverage  encouraged  productivity 
growth, it should show up in the relation of leverage, or change in 
leverage, to one of these TFP growth  measures. 
To obtain predicted TFP, we first regressed each industry's TFP 
growth  on a constant, a dummy  equal  to one for 1973  and  later  years (to 
allow for the much-discussed "productivity slowdown"), the lagged 
industry  TFP growth rate, and the growth rate of total manufacturing 
TFP. The sample period for these regressions was 1949-81. We then 
used the estimated equations to forecast industry TFP in 1986. The 
simulations  used actual  manufacturing  TFP, but simulated  lagged  indus- 
try TFP, so they were dynamic simulations  with respect to industry 
TFP. 
Table 7 shows no strong relationship  between leverage and TFP 
growth  across industries.  Regressions  of actual  and  adjusted  TFP  growth 
on the 1981-86  changes  in leverage (absolute  or as a percentage  of 1981 
leverage) yield small and insignificant  coefficients, which are negative 
in three out of four  cases.24 
One  should  not  draw  excessively strong  conclusions  from  the  numbers 
in table 7. It is possible that there is a problem  of reverse causality; it 
may be that leverage actually does increase productivity  growth, but 
that  the industries  that increased  leverage  fastest in 1981-86  were those 
that  were experiencing  the most severe productivity  growth  problems.25 
What  table 7 does show is that  the efficiency  benefits  often attributed  to 
corporate  leverage  have as yet left no mark  in industry-level  data. 
24. An alternative  measure  of efficiency  might  be accounting  return  to capital  (before- 
tax earnings  plus  interest  expense, divided  by the replacement  value  of the capital  stock). 
We computed  return  to capital  numbers  by industry,  using our COMPUSTAT  data set. 
Again  there  is no clear  relationship  between  leverage  and  this measure  of efficiency. 
25. See Blair  and  Litan  (1989)  for evidence that  industries  with a low return  to capital 
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Implications  for Policy 
Conventional  measures of leverage show little improvement  in cor- 
porate  debt  burdens  between 1986  and 1988,  despite  continuing  economic 
expansion  and a strong  stock market.  There  is little or no evidence that 
leverage  is concentrated  in particularly  stable  industries  or in industries 
displaying  improved  productivity  growth.  The potential  risks of corpo- 
rate debt for macroeconomic  stability  should  be taken seriously, while 
the potential  efficiency  benefits  should  be regarded  as unproven. 
Should  policy intervene  to discourage  high  levels of corporate  debt? 
In  the abstract,  the case for  overruling  the free market's  capital  structure 
decisions is not difficult to make. Firms' leverage decisions create 
externalities  at both the microeconomic  and macroeconomic  levels. At 
the microeconomic  level, the risk of financial  distress is borne not only 
by the firm's  managers  and owners, but by its workers, suppliers,  and 
customers, among others. Managers  have little incentive to take the 
costs imposed on third  parties into account when deciding how much 
debt to issue. At the macroeconomic  level, both traditional  Keynesian 
models  and  more  recent theories  of aggregate  demand  externalities  and 
multiple  equilibria  ascribe great importance  to how firms respond to 
changes  in current  economic activity (that  is, firms'  decisions create an 
externality). According to these theories, the more sensitive firms' 
spending  plans are to their current cash flow, the more unstable the 
macroeconomy  will be; in Keynesian terms, high sensitivity implies a 
high  multiplier.  Theory  and  empiricism  both suggest  that  the pressure  of 
debt service will cause highly leveraged firms to cut back investment 
(and, possibly, production  and employment)  more severely than will 
low-leverage  firms  when current  cash flow falls; thus high  leverage  may 
make  the macroeconomy  less stable. Again, this possibility  will not be 
taken  into  account  in private  capital  structure  decisions. 
Despite  the prima  facie case for policy, however, we do not advocate 
any extreme intervention in the determination  of capital structure. 
Precisely  because the profession's understanding  of how capital struc- 
ture  affects  the economy is so rudimentary,  any policy changes should 
be slow and incremental.  One attractive strategy would be to reduce 
artificial  incentives  for high  leverage, including  the tax advantage  given 276  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
to debt  over  equity  and  the  implicit  subsidization  of high  leverage  through 
the deposit  insurance  system. 
Another  potential  role for policy, which would directly address the 
concerns  of some advocates of high  leverage, is to improve  our system 
of corporate governance. Possibilities here include eliminating  legal 
barriers  to paying  managers  profit-based  compensation  and strengthen- 
ing the powers and incentives of directors  to monitor  managerial  per- 
formance.26 
APPENDIX 
Description of the Data 
IN PREPARING this paper we tried to repeat as closely as possible the 
procedures  used in our earlier  paper.27  We began  by comparing  the 1989 
COMPUSTAT  tape, which gives data through 1988, with the  1987 
COMPUSTAT  tape used in our earlier  paper. 
Our earlier paper had a sample of  1,386 firms in 1986. The 1989 
COMPUSTAT  tape had complete 1988  data  on 239 new firms  that  were 
not in our earlier  sample, but it lacked complete data on 282 firms  that 
were in the earlier  sample.  Of  these, 128  were on the 1989  COMPUSTAT 
tape  but  had  to be omitted  because  they provided  incomplete  data,  while 
154  were missing  from  the 1989  tape altogether.  Of these 154  firms,  only 
13 disappeared  from the tape because of LBOs, while 10 went private. 
One hundred  and eighteen firms disappeared  because of mergers or 
acquisitions, and 13 firms disappeared  for miscellaneous reasons (in- 
cluding  2 bankruptcies,  2 liquidations,  and 3 delistings).  Many  acquired 
firms remain in our sample indirectly if the acquiring  firm provides 
complete data. This analysis suggests to us that the omission of LBOs 
from  our sample  will not cause any serious  bias in our  results. 
The 1989  COMPUSTAT  tape has one very important  change from 
earlier  COMPUSTAT  tapes. In 1988  the Financial  Accounting  Standards 
Board  instituted  a new rule, FASB94, which requires  all companies to 
26. Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1988). 
27. Bernanke  and  Campbell  (1988). Ben S. Bernanke, John  Y. Campbell,  and Toni M.  Whited  277 
consolidate  the balance  sheets of their  wholly owned subsidiaries.  This 
change had the greatest  impact  on firms  with large finance  companies, 
such as the big three  auto manufacturers.  The 1989  COMPUSTAT  tape 
gives 1988  data  stated  under  the new rule  for all firms,  but the historical 
data have been restated  on a consistent basis only for some firms.  This 
could bias our calculations  of trends  in corporate  leverage, because for 
some firms  the debt of subsidiaries  is now measured  although  it was not 
before. 
To correct  this problem  we first  divided the original  sample  of 1,343 
(1,386 +  239 -  282) companies into two groups: those that reported 
restated  data for 1986  and 1987  (840 firms)  and those that did not (503 
firms). 
For the group  with restated  data we first  deemed suspect those with 
outstanding  debt greater  than $100 million in either 1987  or 1988. We 
then checked each of these firms  against  data from Moody's Industrial 
Manual,  deleting those with major wholly owned subsidiaries  whose 
restated  data  are  not significantly  different  from  the  old  data.  (Presumably 
these firms  claim  to have restated  their  data  when in fact they have not.) 
This process led to the deletion  of 11  firms. 
For  the group  without  restated  data  we first  decided  to retain  any firm 
whose reported  nominal  asset growth  was less than  6 percent  and whose 
reported  debt growth was zero or less. Of those remaining  (344), we 
once again deemed suspect those with outstanding  debt greater than 
$100 million in either 1987 or 1988. We checked Moody's Industrial 
Manual  and  deleted  all such  firms  with  major  wholly  owned subsidiaries. 
This  process led to the deletion  of 79 firms  from  the original  sample. 
Of the 1,253  firms  remaining,  some reported  data only for 1987  and 
1988,  and  not for 1986.  We excluded  these firms  from  the sample  used in 
tables 1, 2, and 3, leaving  a sample  size of 1,179. However, we included 
these firms  in the sample  used in tables 4 and 5. Some extra firms  were 
excluded  from the sample in these tables because they did not fit into 
any of our  major  industrial  categories. 
To create  older  data  for tables 4 and 5, we combined  restated  data  for 
the years 1986,  1987,  and 1988  with nonrestated  data  for years up to and 
including  1986.  We used the nonrestated  data to create growth  rates of 
debt-asset  ratios  and  interest  expense-current  income  ratios  up to 1986, 
and then combined  these with the restated 1986 levels to get implied 278  Br-ookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1.1990 
restated levels for earlier years. The sample used in tables 4 and 5 is 
always  the largest  available  in each year. 
The data on leverage in table 7 are from the U.S.  Department  of 
Commerce,  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Quarterly Financial  Report for 
Manufacturing,  Mining, and Trade Corporations.  The numbers in the 
table are short-term  debt including  installments  on long-term  debt plus 
long-term  debt, as a percentage  of total assets. Data are fourth-quarter, 
except for 1988,  which are second-quarter  (the most recent available). 
From  mid-1977  until  the end of 1986,  the QFR  numbers  measure  all firms 
in the industry;  before and after  those dates, firms  with assets less than 
$250,000  are excluded. The 1988 leverage column is thus not exactly 
comparable  with the other columns in the table. However, the QFR 
gives 1976 and 1986 numbers  both including  and excluding the small 
firms,  and  the differences  are extremely  small. 
The total  factor  productivity  indexes in table  7 are based on numbers 
available  from  the U. S. Department  of Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics. 
BLS data  are  available  for the 20 two-digit  SIC  manufacturing  industries 
(SIC  20-39), and  for aggregate  manufacturing.  Of the 20 manufacturing 
industries, 15 are also covered by the QFR data, and these are the 
industries  reported  in the table. Comments 
and Discussion 
Mark Warshawsky: In this paper, Ben Bernanke,  John  Campbell,  and 
Toni  Whited  have  updated  and  expanded  upon  Bernanke  and  Campbell's 
earlier Brookings paper examining the financial stability of the U.S. 
nonfinancial  corporate  sector. Using data  from  the 1986, 1987,  and 1988 
annual reports of large corporations  recorded on the COMPUSTAT 
files, they have again  constructed  statistics describing  the distributions 
of some  indicators  of financial  stress, namely,  the ratios  of debt  to assets, 
at market value, and of interest expense to operating income. The 
authors  also have again run simulations  of the impact that recessions 
like those of 1973-74 and 1981-82 would have on the solvency and 
liquidity of nonfinancial  corporations, this time given 1988 balance 
sheets. While  they  find  that  median  and  full  sample  statistics  of indicators 
of financial stress have actually improved slightly over the period, 
statistics describing  the tails of the distributions-the 90th percentile 
and  the simulations-show a further  deterioration  in conditions. 
In addition  to updating  their earlier  analysis to include data for 1987 
and  1988-years that  exhibited  a continued  brisk,  even accelerated,  pace 
of restructuring  activity, and volatile share prices and earnings-Ber- 
nanke,  Campbell,  and  Whited  examined  the  evidence  for  three  arguments 
advanced  by those supporting,  or at least unperturbed  by, the increased 
leverage  of many corporations.  The first argument  maintains  that the 
increased  leverage  has been concentrated  in noncyclical  industries  and 
hence  poses little or no risk to financial  stability  or to overall economic 
activity. The second argument  asserts that interest  rate hedging  imple- 
mented  by swaps,  caps, and  options  effectively  reduces  the vulnerability 
of some corporations  with high leverage to increases in interest rates. 
The third  argument  states that although  increases in leverage may pose 
difficulties  in certain  economic scenarios, the overall improvements  in 
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productivity  resulting  from restructuring  activity are worth the risk- 
reward  trade-off.  The authors produce evidence contrary  to all three 
arguments. 
I think this paper is a worthy supplement  to their earlier carefully 
crafted  and highly  original  paper. I do, however, have some problems 
with some points in both papers  and, in particular,  I am not persuaded 
by the evidence  on the productivity-leverage  question.  In  my comments, 
I will, in part, draw upon my own paper extending and expanding 
Bernanke  and  Campbell's  earlier  analysis.  ' 
While the authors  correctly focus on data from the COMPUSTAT 
files giving  information  about  the financial  situation  of a sample  of large 
public  corporations,  it is nevertheless interesting,  for purposes  of com- 
parison,  to examine  aggregate  statistics  from  the  Flow of Funds  Accounts 
that  attempt  to include  information  about  all, large  and  smnall,  public  and 
private, nonfinancial  corporations.  As shown in the solid line of figure 
1, the ratio of debt liabilities  to total assets at historical  cost has risen 
rapidly  since 1982,  and  in 1988  was at a level close to the high  reached  in 
1973.  The picture  changes considerably,  however, when market  values 
are substituted  for historical  cost. As shown in the dashed line of the 
figure,  the debt-to-asset  ratio  at market  value has actually  declined  since 
1982, although the level  recorded in  1989 still exceeds  the lower 
levels of  the late  1960s. Apparently the strong equity market has 
increased  asset values more than restructuring  activity has increased 
debt outstanding.  It is interesting  to note that the level of the debt-to- 
asset ratio  at market  value in 1988  shown in the figure-0.42-exceeds 
the full sample  ratio reported  by the authors  in their table 3-0.297  or 
0.271. Based on evidence presented in my own paper, this difference 
can be attributed,  in small  part, to the higher  ratios of corporations  not 
included  in the authors'  sample-small firms,  as well as companies  that 
disappeared  over the years owing to mergers,  bankruptcies,  and so on. 
A more significant  explanation  of the difference, however, lies in the 
different  methods used to convert the par value of long-term  debt to 
market  value. The authors employ a rather  elaborate  algorithm  using 
company-specific  information  for the conversion, while I use an aggre- 
gate approach-the ratio  of the market  to par value of corporate  bonds 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange-in  my calculation.  As I show 
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market values  of debt and equity. 
in my paper, at the level  of prices of debt obligations of  specific 
companies, the aggregate approach is often more accurate than the 
algorithm  used by the authors. 
While  the aggregate  and  full sample  ratios  of debt to assets, at market 
value, indicate  an improving  situation,  there are many  reasons why this 
evidence  is incomplete.  In the first  instance, the market  value of assets, 
based  largely  on the market  value of equity, may not reflect the funda- 
mental  value  of firms.  In the second instance, it is often more  instructive 
to know  what  is occurring  among  outliers  than  among  average  corpora- 
tions.  Most  important,  however,  the  market  value  of equity  is determined 
by the  views  of investors  as to what  is most likely  to happen  in the future. 
The stock market,  for purposes  of valuation,  is interested  in the proba- 
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however, the bad outcomes are of main  interest. For these reasons, it is 
absolutely  necessary to examine  other  indicators  of stress, including  the 
ratio of interest expense to operating  income, the upper  percentiles of 
the distributions  of ratios, and, in particular,  the very interesting  and 
important simulation results of the authors. Indeed, most of these 
indicators  seem to show that  the financial  situation  of many  corporations 
has worsened  in the past  few years. In this regard,  I was confused  by the 
differences  in the simulation  results  reported  in the authors'  earlier  and 
present  papers.  In the earlier  paper,  20 percent  of the firms  encountered 
solvency problems in the 1973-74 simulation,  while the debt-to-asset 
ratio  in the full sample  rose from  0.319 in 1986  to 0.962 in recession year 
2. In the present  paper,  by contrast,  25 percent  of the firms  encountered 
solvency problems, while the debt-to-asset ratio for the full sample 
increased  from 0.302 in 1988  to only 0.695 in recession year 2 (table 6). 
My own work on the solvency issue corresponds  more closely to the 
results of the present paper. It should be noted that 25 percent of the 
number  of firms  in the sample  becoming  insolvent  represents,  according 
to my calculations,  about 16 percent of corporate  assets. In addition,  I 
strongly  agree with the authors' statement  that the simulations  should 
be viewed only as an indicator  of potential vulnerability  to financial 
distress and  not as a literal  prediction. 
I now turn to the evidence the authors present about the three 
arguments  supporting  the trend toward higher leverage. I found the 
authors' evidence on the characterization  of debt burden  by industry 
quite convincing;  not only has leverage increased  in cyclical industries 
in the past three years, but, counter  to intuition,  there does not seem to 
be a negative  relationship  between  the volatility  of earnings  and  leverage. 
I also found the authors' evidence about the impact of interest rate 
hedging  suggestive  of their  point  that  hedging  does not prevent  financial 
distress, although  a question  can be raised:  if interest  rate hedging  does 
not prevent financial  distress, why do so many companies  engage in it? 
A more definitive  answer  awaits specific information  about  the hedging 
activities of companies  that should  become available  upon  the adoption 
of Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  Statement  105  in 1991. 
As indicated earlier, I did not find the evidence produced by the 
authors  relating  to the  leverage-productivity  argument  persuasive.  Aside 
from the important  issue of how to measure  an industry's  debt burden, 
whether  at historical  cost or market  value, a more  fundamental  question 
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to test the proposed  argument.  The claim  that  higher  leverage  improves 
productivity  depends on the hypothesis that management  is motivated 
better to control costs by having debt than by having equity on the 
company's  balance  sheet. Because management  is specific  to a company 
and not to an industry, however, the argument  can be tested only by 
data  from  a fixed sample  of specific  companies  or even lines of business. 
The use of QFR  data  is particularly  questionable  given shifts in industry 
composition  owing to mergers  and divestitures  and the lack of a fixed 
sample  of firms  underlying  the data. 
Despite my objections  to certain  points in the paper, the authors  are 
to be congratulated  for their thorough  work on an important  topic. I 
believe that further, larger, and more detailed studies applying the 
simulation  methodology  to various  economic scenarios  would  be helpful 
to our understanding  of the risks involved in higher leverage. I also 
believe it would be fruitful  to follow carefully  over time the firms  in the 
tails of the distributions  or those becoming insolvent or illiquid  in the 
simulations  to see if they succumb  or  how they overcome  their  problems. 
General Discussion 
Joseph Stiglitz noted that observed leverage could change for many 
reasons.  Without  an  explanation  of why debt-equity  ratios  have  changed, 
it is not possible to evaluate either  the extent to which greater  leverage 
indicates  increased  fragility  of the economy or the impact  of leverage  on 
productivity.  For example, if firms finance lower-risk  projects with a 
higher  proportion  of debt, higher  leverage  may simply  indicate  that  firms 
have undertaken  less risky investments. Ben Bernanke  responded  that 
most of the firms with dramatic  increases in leverage were swapping 
debt for equity, not making new investments. Stiglitz also noted a 
difficulty  in identifying  the effect of changes  in leverage  on incentives to 
increase  productivity.  In firms with rapid  productivity  growth, equity 
value will grow rapidly, thus decreasing  their measured  leverage and 
masking  any effect leverage  has on incentives. 
Panelists  disagreed  about  other  evidence surrounding  the relationship 
between leverage and productivity. Benjamin  Friedman  cited studies 
that showed a negative impact of leveraged buyouts on research and 
development  and  capital  investment  expenditures.  Martin  Baily pointed 
out that increased  debt might  improve  the productive  use of resources 
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and development.  This could be true if such spending  had been pushed 
too far by managers engaged in empire building. Franco Modigliani 
noted that negative effects of LBOs on productivity  should not neces- 
sarily be attributed  to leverage; LBOs are frequently  associated with 
major  changes  in the way a firm  is managed. 
William  Brainard  raised a variety of questions about the usefulness 
of industry data in assessing the possibility that increased leverage 
threatens financial stability. He noted not only that the variance of 
industry  earnings  used by the authors  understates  the average  variance 
of the firms' earnings  within  the industry,  but also that, as the authors 
point out elsewhere, it is the condition of the most vulnerable  firms 
within the industry  that is most important.  Idiosyncratic  firm  risks are 
relevant to bankruptcy.  Similarly, the industry betas, indicating the 
covariance  of the growth  in industry  earnings  with the growth  in GNP, 
are an imperfect  measure  of the nondiversifiable  risks of firms,  which is 
what matters  for the valuation  of firms  and  the social risk  of bankruptcy. 
Brainard  also noted  that  other  market  factors  might  be useful  in assessing 
these risks. For example, nondiversifiable  bankruptcy  risk might be 
expected to depend  on the covariance  of a firm's  earnings  or equity  value 
with interest rates. Bernanke suggested that the paper's simulations 
partially  addressed  this issue by assessing the sensitivity of the firm's 
financial  condition  to interest  rate  changes. 
Franco Modigliani  observed that using the nominal  interest rate to 
measure the possibility of liquidity  problems understates  their actual 
likelihood.  Nominal  interest  rate  declines are  frequently  associated  with 
both declines in inflation  and increases in real interest rates, with the 
rise in real rates increasing  the probability  that firms  will have liquidity 
problems.  Friedman  noted that the equity repurchases  appeared  much 
lower in the authors'  sample  than  in the whole economy, suggesting  that 
the authors' results may understate  the increased vulnerability  of the 
corporate  sector to a financial  crunch. 
Panelists  engaged  in a lively discussion  about  the way the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 could have been expected to affect leverage. Modigliani 
expressed surprise  that  average  leverage  has not increased,  since the act 
raised  the capital  gains  tax and  thus  made  debt  more  attractive.  Friedman 
and Bernanke  disagreed,  arguing  that the corporate  tax rate has fallen, 
making  the deductibility  of interest payments less important,  and that 
the increase  in the effective capital  gains tax was less than  the statutory 
increase, since capital  gains  are largely  unrealized. Ben S. Bernanke, John  Y. Campbell,  and Toni M.  Whited  285 
References 
Arak, Marcelle,  Arturo  Estrella, Laurie  Goodman,  and Andrew Silver. 1988. 
"Interest Rate Swaps: An Alternative Explanation."  Financial Manage- 
ment 17:12-18. 
Baker, George  P., and Karen H. Wruck. 1990. "Organizational  Changes  and 
Value Creation  in Leveraged Buyouts: The Case of the 0.  M. Scott and 
Sons  Company." Working Paper 90-041. Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard 
Business School. 
Bernanke,  Ben S., and John Y. Campbell.  1988. "Is There A Corporate  Debt 
Crisis?"  BPEA, 1:1988,  83-125. 
.  1990. "Recent Trends in Corporate  Leverage: Causes and Conse- 
quences." In The High Yield  Debt Market:  Investment  Performance and 
Economic Impact, edited by Edward I. Altman. Homewood, Ill.: Dow- 
Jones Irwin. 
Bicksler, James, and Andrew H.  Chen. 1986. "An Economic Analysis of 
Interest  Rate Swaps." Journal of Finance 41:645-55. 
Blair, Margaret M.,  and Robert E.  Litan.  1989. "Explaining Corporate 
Leverage  and LBO Activity in the 1980s." Washington:  Brookings. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.  1989. Flow of Funds 
Accounts: Financial Assets and Liabilities, Year-End,  1965-1988. Wash- 
ington  (September). 
Brainard,  William C.,  John B.  Shoven, and Laurence Weiss.  1980. "The 
Financial  Valuation  of the Return  to Capital."  BPEA, 2:1980, 453-502. 
Gertler, Mark, and R. Glenn Hubbard. 1989. "Taxation, Corporate  Capital 
Structure,  and  Financial  Distress." Working  Paper  3202.  Cambridge,  Mass.: 
National  Bureau  of Economic Research (December). 
Giammarino,  Ronald  M. 1989.  "The Resolution  of Financial  Distress." Review 
of Financial Studies 2:25-47. 
Gilson, Stuart  C., Kose John, and Larry  H. P. Lang. 1989. "Troubled  Debt 
Restructurings:  An Empirical  Study of Private Reorganization  of Firms in 
Default." University of Texas (November). 
Greenspan,  Alan. 1989. "Statement  before the Committee  on Finance, U.S. 
Senate." Washington:  Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System 
(January). 
Jensen, Michael C.  1989. "Eclipse of  the Public Corporation." Harvard 
Business  Review  89:61-74. 
Kaplan,  Steven  N. 1990.  "Sources  of Value  in Management  Buyouts." Journal 
of Financial  Economics, forthcoming. 
Lichtenberg,  Frank  R., and Donald Siegel. 1989a. "The Effect of Takeovers 
on the Employment  and Wages of Central-Office  and Other Personnel." 
Working  Paper 2895. Cambridge,  Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research  (March). 
.  1989b. "The Effects of  Leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and 286  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Related Aspects of  Firm Behavior." Working Paper 3022. Cambridge, 
Mass.: National  Bureau  of Economic Research  (June). 
Marais, Laurentius, Katherine Schipper, and Abbie Smith. 1989. "Wealth 
Effects of  Going Private for Senior Securities." Journal of  Financial 
Economics  23:155-91. 
Price, John A. M., and Schuyler  K. Henderson. 1988. Currency  and Interest 
Rate Swaps, 2nd ed. London: Butterworths. 
Roach, Stephen S.  1988. "Living with Corporate  Debt." Morgan Stanley 
Economic  Perspectives  (November). 
Shleifer,  Andrei, and Robert  W. Vishny. 1988. "Value Maximization  and the 
Acquisition Process."  Journal of Economic  Perspectives  2:7-20. 
Smith,  Clifford  W., Jr., Charles  W. Smithson,  and Lee Macdonald  Wakeman. 
1988. "The Market for Interest Rate Swaps." Financial Management 
17:34-44. 
Warshawsky,  Mark J.  1990. "Is There A Corporate  Debt Crisis? Another 
Look." Washington:  Board of Governors  of the Federal Reserve System 
(January). 